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Summary 
Performance management systems are introduced to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness in public sectors across the world. We examine four «scandals» cases 
related to coding practice in Norwegian hospitals followed by performance audits by the 
Auditor General and a national revision of the system of coding practices. The 
experience with activity-based financing schemes in combination with the DRG system 
from Norwegian healthcare, is that such systems create loopholes or opportunities for 
behavior that undermine both the very ambitions of performance management systems 
and trust-based management logics. A multiplicity of accountability mechanisms are 
employed to redeem the problem, but have yet to be successful: The organizational 
fragmentation and the institutional complexity that challenges the success of 
performance management also seem to challenge to merits of accountability as a means 
to resolve negative side-effects.  
  4
Sammendrag 
I offentlig sektor verden rundt introduseres mål- og resultatstyringsverktøy gjerne for å 
bedre måloppnåelse og kostnadseffektivitet. Vi undersøker fire «skandalesaker» relatert 
kodepraksis og aktivitetsbasert finansiering i norske sykehus, i tillegg til en revisjon 
foretatt av Riksrevisjonen og en nasjonal gjennomgang av kodepraksis i norske sykehus. 
Erfaringen med aktivitetsbasert finansiering og DRG-systemet i norsk helsevesenet er at 
disse systemene bidrar til å skape smutthull eller mulighet for adferd som undergraver 
både målsettingene med resultatstyringsverktøy og den tillitsbaserte styringslogikken 
som dels har preget norsk offentlig sektor. En rekke sammensatte ansvarsmekanismer 
settes i gang for å bøte på disse problemene, men disse har ikke vært særlig effektive: 
Den organisatoriske fragmenteringen og institusjonelle kompleksiteten som utfordrer 
resultatstyringens egenskaper bidrar også til å utfordre nytten av ansvarsmekanismene 
som ideelt sett skal løse problemer med negative sideeffekter. 
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Introduction 
With the New Public Management reforms implemented in various countries, 
performance management systems intended to enhance public sector efficiency and 
effectiveness were introduced. The idea was to improve public sector performance, 
while hopefully avoiding undesirable side effects. In this article, we investigate the track 
record of a particular performance management system in a specific setting; the activity-
based financing schemes for the Norwegian hospital sector. We are interested in two 
particular aspects: The first is whether this particular performance management system 
has created loopholes or increased the likelihood of negative side-effects, and the 
second is how accountability arrangements deal with undesired behavior in conjunction 
with potential negative side effects. We argue that some negative side-effects, bordering 
general ideas of corruption, are indeed present, and that the accompanying cases of 
accountability measures being set in motion illustrate how performance management 
systems of this kind are influenced by conflicting pressures concerning self-interested 
behavior, normative components of institutional culture and the role of trust in the 
system. 
We approach the selected cases as examples of larger pathologies of public sector 
management associated with the New Public Management. The thesis is that modern, 
performance-based management systems of this kind are more complex than the 
original ideas reflect, and that they are discretionary structures embedded in a political 
context. Our concern is, firstly, to address the problems arising from this particular 
reform innovation by focusing on cases that illustrate negative side effects which are 
well known from analyses of activity based funding systems in hospitals (Ellis 1998). In 
conjunction with this, we also explore how one can understand the role of managers 
and professionals involved in these dysfunctions, discussing various concepts of 
corruption. Secondly, we ask how accountability mechanisms deal with such 
malfunctions; who is accountable for what, and to whom, when something goes wrong? 
We address political, managerial, professional, legal and social forms of accountability, 
and explore instrumental and institutional approaches in searching for explanations. The 
possibility of dysfunctions, variants of corruption and exercises of accountability all 
relate to the role of self-interest and trust towards and within the healthcare system, 
hence the instrumental and institutional explanatory frameworks. 
The Norwegian hospital system is state-owned and publically financed, characterized 
as a system of the NHS or Beveridge type. Around the millennial turn, Norwegian 
hospitals were subject to a series of NPM-style reforms, of which the activity-based 
funding schemes (ABF) were among the more important. The funding scheme builds 
on the Diagnosis Related Groups system (DRG), commonly used in a large number of 
healthcare systems around the world (Kimberly et al. 2008). The DRG system is used to 
classify diagnoses and treatment and to standardize descriptions of hospital activities 
(Byrkjeflot and Torjesen 2010). In activity-based funding schemes, the money follows 
the patient in order to ease patient mobility and to create incentives to increase 
productivity, cost efficiency, quality and transparency (Busse et al. 2011). 
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Reimbursements are connected to the DRG classification system whereby each patient’s 
case is coded according to DRG typologies, each of which carries a pre-calculated cost. 
Coding, classification and calculating reimbursements thus rely on a combination of two 
principles: That medical information is adequately available and possible to process, and 
that the activity-reimbursement calculation actually reflects hospital expenditure. The 
hospitals are paid on the number and type of cases treated, simulating a private-market 
purchaser/provider relationship. Highly relevant to this market simulation, is the 2002 
hospital reform, which created a system of state-owned corporate-like entities organized 
as regional trusts and local enterprises, in place of a county-based system with single 
hospitals being governed through regional government. 
After the 2002 hospital reform, Norwegian hospital governance has been plagued by 
a series of scandals, however, and some of these scandals render a taste of corruption. 
The cases of malpractice seem to have been used to increase the revenues of the 
hospitals themselves, however, rather than to benefit individual employees or managers. 
In this article, we examine four individual ‘scandals’ with high media coverage related to 
coding practice in Norwegian hospitals that occurred during the period 2003–2011. 
These four cases are the total universe of such cases with high media coverage in the 
period, although two other cases have reached the media during 2012. We also 
investigate the following performance audits by the Auditor General in 2003 and 2009 
and a national revision of the system of coding practices carried out by the Directorate 
of Health and the regional health trusts in 2011. The individual cases concern hospital 
officials accused of engaging in various illegal or unethical practices related to charges of 
gaming practices. Some of the cases are direct examples of fraud, whereas others have 
more generally been portrayed as systemic weaknesses. The inclusion of the two 
performance audits and the revision of coding practices as cases for the present study is 
motivated by the need to understand the relative scale and scope of such problems, and 
have this is dealt with in a more systematic manner. 
Analytically, an instrumental and a cultural perspective is applied to display how this 
particular performance management measure is in reality a mixed and complex system 
that encompasses different logics and thus creates possibilities for the negative side-
effects that we observe. The two perspectives include instrumental elements from ad 
hoc preventive efforts by the political leadership, negotiation processes, the influence of 
cultural path-dependency, and elements of rather inappropriate self-interested action. 
The data base for the paper is public documents from the government and the 
Auditor General; press releases issued by the parliament (Storting), the Ministry of 
Health and the health enterprises; information from their web sites; and extensive and 
broad media coverage by national and regional newspapers and TV channels. There is 
also a body of secondary literature that has studied DRG and ABF systems, as well as 
performance management systems and reforms within the NPM paradigm. 
Firstly, we will introduce the Norwegian context by outlining the hospital reform and 
the activity-based funding system. Secondly, we present our conceptual and theoretical 
approach. Thirdly, we examine negative side-effects by focusing on individual cases of 
mismanagement and on the wider implications for professional practice in hospitals and 
accountability issues. Finally, we will discuss our findings with reference to our 
theoretical approach and revisit our initial research questions: Whether the DRG/ABF 
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system creates loopholes or increases the likelihood of negative side-effects, and how 
accountability arrangements deal with undesired behavior in conjunction with such 
negative side effects. 
The Norwegian Context 
The level of trust in public institutions is generally higher in Norway than in most other 
countries (Norris 1999). Collectivist and egalitarian values, consensus-orientation, and 
low levels of internal conflict characterize the country’s public sector. Relations between 
political and managerial executives have traditionally been trust-based, with few external 
or formal steering devices (Christensen and Peters 1999). Trust also informs the 
relationship between the political and administrative leadership and various professional 
groups like the medical profession, relevant to our analysis.  
Traditionally, the Norwegian health care system has been characterized as a single-
payer decentralized model with frame-based reimbursement schemes (Kokko et al. 
1998, Byrkjeflot 2004, Jakobsen 2009), and almost all hospitals are under public 
ownership. This model produced constant budget overruns and repeated negotiations 
on additional funding between different levels of the hospital system. To remedy this, a 
large-scale reform in 2002 transferred ownership of hospitals from the counties to the 
state. Ownership was centralized to the Ministry of Health and removed from the 
regional democratic influence of the county assemblies. An ownership department was 
established to perform this function. The reform also set up new performance 
management principles for the hospitals based on a decentralized enterprise model. The 
hospitals’ structural affinity with the public sector thus changed from being part of 
public administration, as a new organizational affinity was introduced – the health 
enterprises. Five regional health trusts (RHT) with separate executive boards were 
established under the Ministry of Health, and these, in turn, organized approximately 
250 single institutions into 33 local health enterprises (LHE) under regional jurisdiction 
with their own executive boards. The reform thus implied centralization, 
decentralization, and commercialization at the same time (Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 
2005, Byrkjeflot and Neby 2008). A key challenge has been to find the right balance 
between local autonomy and central government control – to fulfill the government 
goal of centralization of policy and decentralization of delivery responsibility. 
Among the main goals of the hospital reform were to enhance coordination and 
efficient utilization of resources and to gain more control over hospital expenditure. To 
reduce these problems, a performance- and activity-based reimbursement system that is 
integrated into the hospitals’ financial management systems was introduced (Neby 
2009). However, it was criticized for not going far enough in promoting market 
mechanisms and for not doing enough to separate the state’s roles as purchaser and 
provider (OECD 2003, 9). Although a single payer, the central state, principally finances 
Norwegian health enterprises, ABF schemes comprise a significant part of hospital 
funding. Resource allocation based on this system was introduced as a partial 
experiment in selected hospitals from 1991, and extended in 1997 (Magnussen and 
Solstad 1994). Despite considerable implementation problems and no clear efficiency 
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gains (Pettersen 1999), a standardized scheme for nationwide mandatory activity-based 
funding of hospitals based on the DRG system was introduced in 2001.  
The DRG system is a medical performance classification system that connects 
hospital activity and patient information by sorting diagnosis, treatment and other 
features into standardized and structured data sets aggregated into homogenous groups. 
DRGs are coupled with pre-calculated costs for each type of treatment, creating a 
system for making medical performance financially transparent and refundable. In the 
Norwegian tax-funded health care system, where financing and ownership of hospitals 
are public, the aim of DRG-based financing is to improve financial performance and 
control hospital costs (Magnussen 1995), but also to stimulate and maintain productivity 
(Helsedirektoratet 2011). In Norway, the DRG system’s main use is resource allocation, 
integrated into the activity-based, per case funding system. The system works as a 
management tool embedded in contracts between both the state and the regional health 
trusts, and between the regional trusts and the local enterprises. In spite of the stated 
principle of not involving central level politicians in detailed matters, the shares of block 
grant versus ABF-based financing has been up for debate in parliament on a yearly 
basis, in budget discussions. Consequently, the activity based share of hospital funding 
has varied considerably – from about 15% to 60%. Generally the ABF system has 
increased activity and reduced waiting lists in the hospitals (Kjerstad 2003, Kjerstad and 
Kristiansen 2005), but is also thought to have increased costs (Byrkjeflot and Torjesen 
2010). The promised efficiency gain is contested (Jakobsen 2009). 
Our concern, however, is not whether main aims concerning efficiency, 
effectiveness, or even health policy implementation, has been adequately achieved. 
Rather, we are interested in the side effects of introducing such a performance-based 
management tool to this complex setting. Patient mobility and financial challenges have 
been high on the agenda, and the organizational system of trusts and enterprises and the 
DRG/ABF systems complement each other – notably as an example of NPM-style 
reform measures.  
Conceptual and theoretical approaches 
Co r r up t i on ,  gam ing ,  r u l e - bend i ng  
Recent scandals and media coverage encouraged us to ask the question of whether such 
performance management systems create ‘blind spots’ or loopholes where undesired 
action takes place, and how accountability relations accompanying the NPM 
development connects to such action. A claim is that most health care systems face 
problems of incomplete and asymmetrical information, which implies that it is 
vulnerable to market failure and also prone to legal and illegal abuse (Barr 2004, 
Rothstein 2011). Quasi market reform elements, such as activity- based funding, 
typically establish rules for decision-making, information sharing and transaction. These 
rules leave room for interpretation and have a necessary vagueness and flexibility, which 
is legitimate because the activities and actions within the system have an ambiguous 
nature. However, this leeway also gives creative actors opportunities for gaming the 
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system (Morreim 1991). Thus, there is an inherent tension: Universalistic norms are 
necessary, but there is an obligation to particularism; or in other words, both ‘doing 
your job and helping your friend’ (Heimer 1992). Taken to extremes, the rule bending 
that cheating and gaming involves, can eventually become outright fraud and 
corruption, violating principles of impartiality and justice. 
Standard definitions of corruption include abuse of public office for private gain 
(World Bank 1997), but others argue that corruption also encompasses organizational 
gain (Rothstein 2011). Often illegal, corruption includes undermining impartiality and 
enhancing favoritism even when formal rule breaking is not present (Rothstein 2011). 
Impartial norms of fairness imply that like cases should be treated alike. Such 
impartiality is essential to both medical research and clinical practice, suggesting that 
doctors should not have a financial interest in the treatments they are evaluating (Angell 
2009). Rule bending that is not formally illegal, but that nevertheless challenge norms of 
impartiality or due process, has been labeled «legal corruption». By this we mean that 
agents may act to unduly or inappropriately influence the rules of the game and to shape 
institutions, policies and regulations for their own benefit (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; 
Rothstein 2011, 60). With such breaches of the public ethos, public policy is «captured» 
by various illegitimate interests instead of serving the public. Such conduct within the 
healthcare system challenges the public’s trust in medical institutions (Savedoff and 
Hussman 2006) in terms of medicine as much as politics, as medical professionals are 
normally given broad discretion and are assumed (and trusted) to be acting in patients’ 
best interests. 
In this paper we focus on cases that portray exercises of influence by public actors – 
practitioners, officials or organizations – that conflict with the actors’ assigned public 
role. The actors in question have been entrusted to provide services to the population, 
based on a framework that consists of both legislation and expectation. Within this 
framework, decisions about allocation of resources are made. Resources that are 
allocated in an inappropriate manner – whether in legal or ethical terms – can thus be 
perceived as corruption although direct private benefit might not be the case 
(Kaufmann ancd Vincente 2011). This approach covers both individual corruption 
(where hospital officials act as quasi-private actors using influence and public resources 
to obtain unofficial benefits), and hospital organizations that operate in a coordinated 
way to exploit their position (Ensor and Duran-Moreno 2002, 106). A timely question is 
why the specific concept of corruption should be applied to such cases as those we are 
investigating, and whether our cases actually meet the criteria for falling within the 
corruption or legal corruption classifications. Our argument is that the common 
denominator of standard corruption cases and the cases investigated here, rests with the 
unmistakable breach of trust that both instances entail: Whether for public or private, 
individual or organizational gain, the actions undertaken challenge normative standards 
for action motivated by self-interest, such as increasing revenue or securing particular 
benefits on another actor’s expense.  
In terms of the DRG/ABF system, there are several well-known ways to game the 
system. Labels such as «DRG-creep», patient selection, «upcoding» patient diagnostics, 
«creaming» and «skimping» are well known in both the international and Norwegian 
literature (see e.g. Donaldson and Magnusson 1992, Ellis 1998, Mikkola et al. 2002, 
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Morriem 1991, Silverman and Skinner 2003, Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani 2009, 
Martinussen and Hagen 2009, Cots et al. 2011). DRG-creep means patients are placed in 
higher-priced DRGs than their actual state of health would warrant, or, in other words: 
The hospital receives more money per treatment than suggested by the pre-calculated 
cost (Modell 2004). Illegal DRG creep occurs when physicians intentionally register 
false diagnoses so that their hospital or clinic will receive more money (Kastberg and 
Siverbo 2007). This «upcoding» is a practice of improper and manipulated registration 
whereby patients are reclassified into more lucrative categories (Culyer and Posnett 
1990). Active cheating can in principle of be of three different types (Hsia et al. 1988); 
mis-specification (the wrong diagnosis is applied), miscoding (reporting treatment that 
has not been conducted), and re-sequencing (changing the sequence of diagnoses or 
reporting a secondary diagnosis as the main diagnosis in cases when this would result in 
higher reimbursement). Such «creative coding» are practices favorable to providers, by 
altering coding sequence or manipulating diagnosis or treatment coding are well known 
within healthcare institutions (Kastberg and Siverbo 2007). 
Another kind of mismanagement is «DRG dumping» (avoidance of high severity 
patients) on a more aggregated level which implies that clinics prefer easier cases and 
avoid certain costly patient groups that are unprofitable under the activity- based 
funding system(Ellis 1998). Other variants are «creaming» (over-provision of services to 
low severity patients), «skimping», (under-provision of services to high severity patients) 
and «skimming» whereby profitable and low cost patients will be selected over patient 
groups yielding a lower profit per treatment. Activities that do not yield a net income 
tend to be given low priority (NOU 2003:1). This may result in patients with chronic 
diseases, as well as «soft services» (e.g. research, chronically ill patients, habilitation, 
rehabilitation and psychiatry) losing out in the competition for resources. «DRG-
gaming» or under-treating of patients is also known from the literature as a dysfunction 
of the activity-based funding system. This refers to situations where patients are 
undertreated because the clinic wants to save on certain tests or treatments that are 
normally done in relation to a certain diagnosis (Kastberg and Siverbo 2007). All these 
mechanisms could serve as instances of legal corruption, where the breach is towards 
the public ethos, the general expectation towards the hospital, or due process. In many 
instances, pinpointing illegal behavior would be difficult in such cases. 
Public accountability: Resolving the problems of 
many eyes, many hands 
In dealing with the potential for illegitimate behavior, the main purposes of 
accountability are to, firstly, prevent corruption and abuse of power, and, secondly, to 
ensure the practical specification and resolving of tensions arising from inappropriate 
behavior that has already taken place. Public accountability suggests that executives 
must exercise public authority as matters of public interest (Bovens 2007a). Our focus is 
on the means by which illegitimate or corrupt behavior can be assessed. We apply a 
rather narrow concept of accountability, defined as «…a relationship between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
GAMING THE SYSTEM AND ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS NOTAT  9  -  2012  
 11 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgments, and the actor may face 
consequences’ (Bovens 2007b:450) that may be formal or informal». Bovens (2007b) 
claims that accountability is by nature retrospective – i.e. a form of ex post scrutiny, but 
by illustrating normative pressures towards actors, setting standards and displaying 
potential consequences there is an ex ante dimension as well. 
In our cases, accountability relationships revolve these two dimensions (Bovens et al. 
2010); firstly, to deal with cases where public officials acting within the ABF/DRG 
system exceed the limitations and constraints that that have been set by regulatory 
bodies or superior units. Secondly, accountability should contribute to keeping the 
practitioners’ behavior in check, to prevent the abuse of authority. Thus, key questions 
are whether the accountability arrangements in place have the power to reveal 
corruption and mismanagement, and whether the available sanctions are strong enough 
to have a preventive effect. In dealing with these two purposes, accountability relations 
embrace several different aspects. Public organizations face «the problem of many eyes» 
meaning they are accountable to a number of different forums that apply different sets 
of criteria. Building on Romzek and Dubnick’s research (1987), Bovens (2007b) 
elaborates on five types of accountability based on different types of forums an actor 
must report to (see also Byrkjeflot, Christensen and Lægreid 2012). He sees political 
accountability as external control of an agency by different actors or institutions such as 
voters, members of parliament, ministers and cabinet (Mulgan 2003). The voters 
delegate their sovereignty to popular representatives in elected bodies, who further 
delegate authority to the cabinet and the health enterprises. Their obligation to account 
then moves in the opposite direction. This is traditionally mainly seen as a vertical 
accountability relationship, where the forum formally has power over the actor due to 
hierarchical organizational solutions. 
Administrative accountability is typically also related to an actor’s location within a 
hierarchy in which a superior calls a subordinate to account for the performance of 
delegated duties, but it occurs in different variants (Sinclair 1995). A range of scrutiny 
bodies that perform supervision and control can exercise it. These may be inspectors, 
controllers, regulatory agencies, ombudsmen, independent supervisory offices, auditing 
offices, etc. Contemporary reforms have put strong emphasis on managerial 
accountability, which means that managers on the one hand have been granted extended 
autonomy – but on the other hand they are held more directly accountable for their 
ability to produce measurable results and to run their organizations efficiently, 
presupposing a system of clear separation of policy making and policy implementation 
(Wallis and Gregory 2009). Managerial accountability is about monitoring output and 
results and making those with delegated authority answerable for carrying out agreed 
tasks according to agreed performance criteria (Day and Klein 1987).  
Legal accountability denotes strong control by and accountability towards an external 
actor, for example a judicial authority. With increasing formalization of social relations 
and because of greater trust in courts than government, legal accountability is becoming 
more important in public institutions. Legal accountability is seen as the most 
unambiguous type of accountability, since it is based on specific, formalized definitions 
of responsibility, accountability and procedure. 
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Professional accountability revolves around professional standards and expertise. It 
addresses mechanisms of professional peers or peer review. Particularly in typical 
professional public organizations different professions are constrained by professional 
codes of conduct – i.e. catalogues of conduct deemed appropriate – and scrutinized by 
professional organizations or disciplinary bodies. It is a system marked by deference to 
expertise where one relies on the technical knowledge of experts (Romzek and Dubnick 
1987). This type of accountability is particularly relevant for public managers who work 
in public organizations concerned with professional service delivery, such as hospitals. 
Social accountability arises out of a lack of trust in government and the existence of 
several potential social stakeholders in the government or public apparatus. This 
produces pressure on public organizations (whereby they feel obliged) to account for 
their activities vis-à-vis the public at large, the media, stakeholders, or (civil) interest 
groups, users’ organizations and patients’ organizations, via public reporting, public 
panels or information on the internet (Malena et al. 2004). Giving account to various 
stakeholders in society normally occurs on a voluntary basis and has been labeled 
horizontal accountability (Schillemans 2008). 
This means that actors within a public hospital system face a range of different 
accountability types, creating crossing tensions and complex patterns of expectations to 
the roles that the actors inhabit. On the other hand, accountability forums face a similar 
challenge – «the problem of many hands». In practice, a forum may substantial 
difficulties when deciding which actors to hold to account (Thompson 1980). It is often 
difficult to find out who has contributed in what way to implementation of the DRG 
system in specific hospitals and units and who can be held to account for the established 
practice. An actor can be an individual or an organization, and accountability can be 
hierarchically or collectively oriented. 
In assessing the questions of who is accountable and to whom, there are three steps 
or phases in accountability processes that need to be investigated (Bovens 2007b). 
Firstly, there is information gathering. Who gathers information, how is it done, and to 
what extent does it connect to accountability relationships in the formal sense? 
Secondly, there is a discussion phase, in which the information gathered is assessed. A 
range of different forums and actor constellations may be involved, and such processes 
may be open or more closed and take place in different contexts. Lastly, there is 
judgment, where consequences become apparent. In this phase, forums pass judgment 
on the basis of the information at hand and the discussions undertaken. Consequences 
can be formal and include sanctions, but can also be more informal and «soft». 
In assessing accountability in the cases for this paper, we are first and foremost 
interested in establishing a connection between breaches of public trust (or corruption-
like behavior) and side effects of the activity based financing system on the one hand, 
and creating an understanding and tentative explanation of how this connection is dealt 
with through accountability arrangements on the other. We do not attempt to conclude 
on the question of whether such cases – or negative side effects of DRG/ABF – are 
becoming more or less common in the Norwegian hospital system. Our aim is to a) 
explore what possible negative side effects of DRG/ABF may be, and b) suggest a 
possible explanation for such effects and their coupling with accountability. 
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Instrumental and cultural explanations; the 
problem of trust 
A potential problem with modern performance-oriented management systems is that 
trust may be difficult to maintain. Traditional public systems with informal trust-based 
responsibility are challenged by more formal accountability systems, which many 
perceive as reflecting distrust (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Some researchers 
presuppose that performance-management systems are based on an assumption that 
subordinate units cannot be trusted because their main concern is to fulfill their own 
self-interest (Boston et al. 1996, Self 2000). Others argue that a certain level of mutual 
trust is necessary to put a performance management system into practice, due to the 
greater leeway and discretion given to the subordinate units (Christensen, Lægreid and 
Stigen 2006). These tensions indicate that performance management systems could be 
double-edged swords or hybrids that assume both autonomy and control (Lægreid, 
Roness and Rubecksen 2006). On the one hand, public sector organizations are 
assumed to be self-interested bodies that cannot be trusted and need to be controlled 
through specified performance contracts and assessments. On the other hand, 
subordinate units and superior bodies have common interests based on mutual trust, 
and the only way to increase the efficiency of public bodies is to give operating 
managers more discretion and leeway in deciding how to use allocated resources. This 
inbuilt tension in performance management between models of flexibility, trust and 
managerial autonomy on the one hand, and principal-agent models of distrust and 
central control on the other hand (Christensen and Lægreid 2001), reflects the starting 
point for our explanatory framework.  
Analytically, we contrast two management models – one institutional model and one 
instrumental model. The first is a trust-based model, informed by traditional cultural 
elements, based on a high level of mutual trust and understanding between the local, 
regional, and central levels in the hospital sector. With regard to cultural factors actors 
operate according to a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). Organizational 
members are transformed through a process of norm-formation and internalization of 
common goals, values and mission. Institutional routines are followed even if they are 
not obviously in the narrow self-interest of the person or organization responsible. This 
model envisages a high degree of decentralization and local autonomy. The intention is 
to let the managers manage and the argument is that this will enhance cost-efficiency by 
giving them discretion in using allocated recourses. There is a well-developed system of 
dialogue, cooperation, and informal networks. Mutual trust is a central feature of the 
system and a precondition of autonomy. This model is in line with the traditional 
Norwegian model of mutual cooperation and consensus (Christensen 2005), and from 
such a perspective we expect informal and internal professional accountability and social 
accountability relations to dominate. 
In the second model, performance management models are to a greater extent seen 
as based on distrust, technical-instrumental features and tight performance monitoring. 
In this version of a performance-management model, health enterprises pursue their 
own interests based on local rationality and institution-specific goals, which are not 
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necessarily consistent with the overall goals of central government (Cyert and March 
1963). The idea is to make the managers manage. They need to be controlled via formal 
contracts and management systems, monitoring, formal accountability mechanisms and 
assessment arrangements. Actors with this perspective act in accordance with a logic of 
consequentiality and in cases of misbehavior they will face negative consequences. In 
such a low-trust scenario performance management is based on discipline and 
punishment (Pollitt 2006). From this approach, the expectation is that more formal 
managerial accountability relations but also political accountability relations will 
dominate. 
The DRG system may be seen as a technical instrument based on objective evidence. 
But the system nevertheless exists within political-administrative systems with various 
levels of mutual trust, which makes the application of the system a more complex 
matter (Aucoin and Jervis 2004). Mutual trust relations affect both goal acceptance and 
performance reporting between organizational units (Light 2006): The degree of goal 
acceptance by subunits or individual members of an organization is likely to increase 
when there is a high level of mutual trust between political and managerial executives on 
the one hand, and subunit members on the other. 
In the present study, we use processes of accountability arising from the application 
of DRG/ABF in Norway to explore what may happen when traditional trust-based 
professional norms and values are confronted with a technical-economic local logic. The 
question is whether trust is easily maintained in new performance-management systems, 
or if performance management systems promote instrumental, self-interested strategies. 
Mutual trust may thus be seen as a major precondition for delegation and institutional-
professional autonomy, but an undermining of trust may potentially lead to undesirable 
behavior and more centralization and control. At lower management levels one may 
expect less loyalty to the system, creating higher vulnerability to cheating and 
undermining of trust. 
The DRG system builds partly on professional discretion, as it presupposes that 
professionals follow the intentions of the system as a collective endeavour and that 
professional norms are appropriate for guiding their practice. The system also 
presupposes that actors are prepared to take action if administrators or professionals use 
intricate strategies unfairly. It is a system that combines trust in the professions with 
procedures to avoid negative side effects, such as methods for controlling «DRG-creep» 
or cheating on the system (Hood 2002). In other words, there is an inbuilt tension 
between relying on trust and establishing controls based on distrust. 
One reason for this potential loose coupling of ideals and practice in the ABF and 
DRG systems is that it is rather difficult to create a fair system in which resources used 
and reimbursed are exactly proportionate. The standardization of reimbursements 
creates possible inaccuracies that might lead to the most «valuable» patients being more 
sought after than those who represent a financial «burden». Another reason is that it is 
left to the doctors’ discretion to decide on diagnosis – one with higher, medium or 
lower rewards. Thirdly, patients often have multiple problems, and it is then left to 
doctors’ professional judgment to rank main and secondary diagnoses. This could also 
potentially result in various strategies to obtain greater rewards. Fourthly, the DRG 
system differentiates according to a patient’s treatment phase. This may lead to hospitals 
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or hospital units competing for patients. Although there are professional norms that 
constrain constant abuses of such a system, it still offers considerable leeway, 
particularly when traditional trust-based professional norms and values are confronted 
with technical-economic local logic that potentially may not care much whether the 
hospital system as a whole functions (Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). 
Empirical findings: «Gamers» held accountable 
In the following sections, we attempt to illustrate both how the Norwegian ABF/DRG 
system can contribute to negative side effects and how such effects are dealt with in 
terms of accountability. We do so by focusing on a series of cases that revolve around 
coding and manipulation of patients’ records that in turn influence the financial 
situation of the hospitals in question. All these cases in one way or another revolve 
around the DRG and/or ABF system, coding practices and economic benefit.  
Two cases are about formal investigations of coding practices in general, whereas the 
other four are single cases uncovered through different processes. The two general cases 
can be interpreted as both being part of a long-lasting sequence, but in order to illustrate 
the timeline and importance of the continuous development and use of the DRG/ABF 
system, we have opted to separate them. The DRG-based funding system implied that 
the economic risk of hospital treatment is largely devolved to providers (Bode 2012). 
One main finding from the literature is that performance management increases risk 
taking (Shapiro 1994, Greve 2003), including gaming and cheating. Processes and 
structures based on different forms of accountability are used to display how this 
gaming goes on, but also to assess to the role of trust in understanding the side-effects 
of the ABF/DRG system. We argue that three distinct phases in processes of 
accountability (information gathering, discussion/debate, passing of judgment/ 
consequences) need to be assessed in order to grasp the essence of our cases. We follow 
these three phases in our presentation of the cases.  
The 2003 Arendal Hospital coding scandal: 
In 2003, a leading newspaper reported what was later labeled a coding scandal in a 
regional health enterprise (Aftenposten 12.3.03). A clinic had registered more than 50 
per cent of all patients having undergone/needing tonsillectomies as needing snoring 
operations. A physician had proposed to the health enterprise a new «creative» way of 
coding, primarily by adding a secondary diagnosis to the primary. He posed as an 
external «consultant» and asked for a 10 per cent commission of the extra funding 
yielded by this practice. The managing director of the regional health enterprise and 
some local enterprises agreed to this, which brought each hospital extra funding to the 
tune of several million Norwegian kroner. When the scam was revealed, the minister 
mounted an investigation and the board of the regional health trust was instructed by 
the minister to report back. An external auditing firm was hired to investigate the case, 
who found that 48 per cent of the investigated coding was false. Interestingly, the 
scandal was initially revealed by a newspaper, but as soon as the case gathered 
momentum a more formal investigation was instigated and accountability mechanisms 
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were set in motion. In gathering information about the conduct, the minister relied on 
two separate mechanisms: the hierarchical instruction of the regional trust’s board 
within the governance chain, but also the engagement of an external accounting 
business (Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). 
The case attracted national attention and was seen as undermining trust both in the 
funding system and in public health care generally. A thorough administrative and 
political debate on the matter arose, indicating that central actors took the potential 
undermining of the delegation of authority through the ABF system seriously. The 
standing committee on scrutiny and control in the Storting asked for an evaluation of 
the activity-based funding system, and the Auditor General conducted a performance 
audit of the DRG/ABF system, focusing on the coding of patient diagnoses.  
The manager of the local health enterprise and the clinic manager involved resigned, 
and illegal surplus grants given to the hospital had to be paid back. The director of the 
regional health enterprise was at first severely criticized and stripped of many of his 
board chairmanships, later he resigned from his position. The minister eventually also 
replaced the executive board of the regional health enterprise. Thus, we see that the 
consequences were formal and followed the hierarchical chain from minister to regional 
board to local director and hospital manager. 
Another consequence of the coding case was that the Ministry of Health for the first 
time conducted a thorough evaluation of the activity-based funding system for 
Norwegian hospitals. Upgrading of treatment was revealed to be a widespread practice; 
three out of five hospitals practiced some kind of creative coding to increase funding. 
By example, the number of snoring surgeries more than doubled between 1999 and 
2003. As a consequence of the scam, the Ministry of Health in 2004 reduced the 
reimbursement for snoring operations to one third of the 2003 tariff. 
This case illustrates that the incentives created by the DRG/ABF system can increase 
risk taking and challenge mutual trust relations. The physicians and administrative 
actions undermine the trust on which the balance between central control and 
professional autonomy is based (Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). The case also 
reveals that when individuals act in accordance with ideas that benefit organizational 
actors (hospital management), such systems may yield room for the enrichment of 
individuals – as in classic corruption cases. In terms of accountability, information 
gathering was a formal reaction to media attention, the discussion became a national 
political issue, and directly involved actors were formally held accountable – and second 
order accountability relations caused large-scale investigations and changes in the 
national activity-based financing system. 
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The 2010 Asker and Bærum Hospital manipulating of patients’ records:2  
In late 2009 and early 2010, the national newspaper VG ran a series on the problem 
with long waiting lists in the Norwegian hospital system.3 The newspaper revealed that 
Asker and Bærum hospital in the local health enterprise Vestre Viken, had not followed 
up on patients as it was supposed to, because of a semi-systematic alteration of patients’ 
records. Patients had not received proper information about waiting times for hospital 
treatment, about opportunities to complain about hospital decisions, about their right to 
treatment, nor about the possibility to choose between providers. Patient records were 
accessed and changed, particularly information relevant for making follow-up 
appointments and records of examinations performed before discharge. 
This caused more manageable and favorable-looking waiting lists for the hospital, as 
fewer patients were added to them. Length of waiting lists and time spent waiting by 
patients are among the parameters for measurement of hospital performance. The 
problem persisted for six years before being uncovered, and as a consequence several 
lives were lost. This taps into the DRG/ABF system by short-circuiting the 
administrative requirement for hospital activity to be made public. Possible gains for the 
hospital included a lesser likelihood for becoming a subject to cost containment 
measures and an improvement in its reputation, but also an alteration of the financial 
basis for the hospital as a result of actual diagnoses not being recorded, reported and 
coded appropriately. 
Several forums were involved in the information phase of this case. Chronologically, 
the first forum was the media. The investigations by the newspaper VG triggered a 
direct scrutiny of the journal practices in Asker and Bærum hospital, effectively raising 
the issue and pointing a finger at a serious systemic problem. The Board of Health 
Supervision, in its formal role as an administrative forum for holding the hospital 
accountable for its practices, immediately became involved in the case. Moreover, 
because the case involved illegal conduct, the Board of Health Supervision reported the 
health enterprise to the police, who made their own investigation of the case. The board 
of the Vestre Viken enterprise also acted as a forum towards the hospital management, a 
                                                 
2 This case differs from the other three single cases in the sense that it is not directly about activity based financing. It 
does revolve around the registration of medical practice, however, and connects to the foundation for the ABF 
system: By manipulating performance data (journals, treatment records, etc), the hospital may influence or short-
circuit the potential for patients to exercise free choice of provider and actually create available treatment capacity 
by not following up on discharged, previous patients, which both are connected to ABF component of hospital 
revenue. 
3 In early 2012, the broadcasting corporation TV2 uncovered a resembling case, taking place in Norway’s largest 
hospital – Oslo University Hospital. Also in this case, it appears that managers were partially aware of, partially 
endorsing creative waiting list practices based on financial incentives: Patients were placed in inappropriate 
categories in order to circumcise waiting list problems that have economic consequences for the hospital. Source: 
http://www.tv2.no/nyheter/innenriks/helse/ulovlig-triksing-med-ventelister-paa-oslosykehus-3721969.html . This 
has later been verified in an internal report (NRK 7.5 2012).  
A similar case was revealed by TV2 in September 2012. The patient ombud in Hedmark and Oppland claimed that 
there was a culture of cheating on waiting lists for psychiatric patients to save money in Hospital Innland which 
resulted in breaking the law on patients’ rights. This practice was characterized as «gambling, corruption and 
cheating» by Leif Roar Falkum, an experienced psychiatrist (TV2 News 26.9 2012, 27.9 2012) 
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particular issue being that the hospital had initially denied its own board access to 
internal reports on the matter – even after the scandal had become a fact. 
The case triggered a prolonged public debate establishing a picture of a hospital 
system in crisis. With the national attention one could perhaps expect the involvement 
of central actors, but in this particular case the problem was considered local and 
confined; leading public officials were only marginally affected. The discussion pointed 
at specific practices in particular organizational locations and the case was considered a 
direct violation of regulations more than a systemic flaw. The focus was on malpractice 
rather than system failure.  
In terms of sanctions, all board members (except one) of the Vestre Viken health 
enterprise were replaced, and at least three managers were removed from their 
positions. The police investigation ended with the health enterprise being fined 5 million 
NOK. Sanctions were severe and formally issued as a consequence of a direct breach of 
standard codes of conduct and regulations for hospitals. The role of the police also 
signals that a hospital administration is not exempt from legal investigation, reflecting 
the severity of loss of life. The sanctions issued by the police were directed towards the 
hospital and not towards individual managers or medical professionals. 
The case shows how systematic malpractice can cross formal institutional boundaries 
when it comes to accountability. The revelation of severe irregularities with respect to 
patients’ records seems to have drawn attention to almost all possible accountability 
relations: internally within the enterprise board and the hospital management, between 
the board and the enterprise owner, between the Board of Health Supervision and both 
organizational and individual actors, between the police and the enterprise, and not least 
between the media and all involved parties. In effect, the case displays the realities of 
accountability in multi-level governance systems, where different accountability 
mechanisms are combined in extended processes. The media, the enterprise and trust 
boards, health audit agencies and the police were involved in all three phases of the case, 
although the formal forums gradually came to play a more prominent role as the case 
moved from the information phase to debate and judgment. 
The 2011 cheating on coding in Lillehammer Hospital:  
In June 2011, a standing committee acting as advisor to the Ministry of Health on issues 
of activity-based financing, uncovered a systematic wrongful coding practice at the 
relatively small Lillehammer hospital, which is part of the enterprise Sykehuset 
Innlandet. In this case, minor injuries had been coded as multiple traumas. The 
committee stated that the code manipulation could not have been motivated by 
anything other than a desire to increase the enterprise’s revenues (VG June 24, 2011).  
In this case, it was the central administration that initially discovered the malpractice. 
In contrast to the first two cases, the media did not play a role in uncovering the 
conduct in question. The committee had been working with statistics concerning 
hospital activity, and Lillehammer hospital was found to have an incredible success rate 
in the treatment of multiple traumas; so successful, in fact, that the number of treated 
traumas exceeded the likely number of such injuries in the hospital’s catchment area. 
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When the committee took a closer look at the statistics, it realized that the hospital had 
been employing a different coding practice to other Norwegian hospitals.  
Early in the debate phase, the local health enterprise stated that it would refund the 
extra revenue, but also added that the guidelines and regulations concerning coding and 
activity-based financing were unclear, and that this might have contributed to the code 
cheating at Lillehammer hospital. The managing director of the unit involved resigned 
immediately. Interestingly, both the local medical professionals at the hospital and the 
enterprise board supported the department manager, notwithstanding the fact that the 
code cheating had been going on for several years. In the rather sparse media coverage 
of the case (compared to the two previous cases), the manager is sometimes described 
as an authority on coding questions – although by supportive actors. The individual in 
question remained an employee of the unit, but without any managerial responsibilities. 
The discussion phase seemed to revolve around whether the committee’s criticism was 
just, around possible sanctions and around the severity of the problem. In this case, it 
was evident that no patients had come to harm, reducing damage to breaches of 
appropriate practice and unlawful economic gain. 
The case shows that how severely inappropriate coding practices are perceived seems 
to depend on the possible consequences for patients and on whether the malpractice is 
seen as a systemic problem. In this case, formal sanctions were not issued – in part 
because the individual in question resigned from his managerial position and in part 
because the hospital management immediately acknowledged the wrongdoing and 
decided to reimburse the state. This means that the size and scope of the case matters 
when it comes to activating accountability mechanisms. More importantly, the hospital’s 
statement regarding unclear regulation shows how loopholes may exist within 
performance measurement systems such as the DRG/ABF system. 
The 2011 cheating on coding in Drammen Hospital:  
In late 2011, the national broadcasting corporation NRK revealed that patients with 
same-day appointments in Drammen Hospital, a subdivision of the Vestre Viken 
enterprise, were being registered as overnight patients – even though they had not spent 
the night at the hospital. This time, the coding practice did not have direct medical 
consequences, but brought substantial financial gains to Drammen hospital. In effect, 
the false coding practices led to increased expenditure for the state and increased 
revenue for the hospital. An interesting facet to this case is that the unit manager was 
notified about the code cheating but did not take action for six weeks. Finally, an 
employee leaked information about the practice to the regional health trust, which 
demanded a full investigation. Again, the media served as the initial investigator. The 
reluctance of the department manager to deal with the case seems to have jeopardized 
the internal investigation of the case, leaving it for the police to investigate.  
The enterprise board accepted a fine from the police: Quite openly, Vestre Viken 
health enterprise admitted that Drammen hospital had wrongfully coded at least 1500 
patients over an extended period of time, which means that the fundamental facts of the 
case have been established. What the case shows, however, is that the coupling of 
coding responsibilities with financial incentives creates room for inappropriate 
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maneuvering. In terms of accountability, we again observe the combination of informal 
external attention with more formal action – in this case by the police. As with the 2011 
Lillehammer case, this case also shows how internal, trust-based accountability 
mechanisms do not seem to hinder code cheating, and also that internal reactions are 
rather soft. This could perhaps indicate a strong loyalty among professionals, where 
external control and «bureaucratic excess» are seen as part of the problem rather than as 
a solution to malpractice. 
Performance audit by the Auditor General from 2002:  
A performance audit of the activity-based funding system in 2002 revealed that many 
hospitals lacked information necessary for the systems to work as expected (Dokument 
no 3:6 2001-2002). In 2003, the Auditor General submitted a performance audit report 
to parliament on efficiency in hospitals (Dokument no. 3:3 (2003-2004)). The report 
revealed a shift from less profitable to more profitable surgery, where hospitals tended 
to give preference to the most profitable patients and in some instances to favor 
economics over medical criteria. The minister was very critical of this fact, which he saw 
as a dysfunction of the system, as did the Storting. In terms of information, this process 
was a formal authoritative investigation. The accountability relationship between 
hospitals and the Auditor General is an indirect two-step process and operates in the 
shadow of the hierarchy; it has also been labeled diagonal accountability by Schillemans 
(2008). 
The proportion of DRG-based performance funding had increased from 30 per cent 
of total governmental payments to hospitals in 1997 to 60 per cent in 2003. In 2004, 
however, it was reduced to 40 per cent, partly as a consequence of the negative impact 
of productivity incentives. This was done in spite of a recommendation by a public 
commission that the use of activity-based funding should be increased (NOU 2003:1). 
The government’s argument was that performance-based funding tended to stimulate 
productivity, while at the same time reducing control over health service priorities and 
over total health service spending. Activity-based funding tends to lead to the greatest 
expansion in areas where the hospital can get most income and not necessarily in the 
areas where the medical needs are greatest. The new system reduced waiting times but 
also produced overcapacity in some areas and a bias towards diseases that are easy to 
quantify and involve predictable costs at the expense of more serious, unpredictable and 
complex illnesses (Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). However, already in 2005 the 
share of ABF funding was raised to 60 per cent, again. Since 2007, the share has been 
around 40 per cent of total hospital reimbursements (Kalseth et al. 2010). 
This illustrates that the political debate at the national level on activity-based 
financing has been rather vivid since its nationwide introduction in 2001. The 
functioning of the ABF system has been perceived as important to reach the 
overarching goal of cost containment, but also to influence productivity. On this level, 
sanctions are basically matters of policy formulation, such as negotiations on the portion 
of funds to be allocated through the ABF system. 
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The national revision of coding practices in 2010/2011:  
In 2010 the Directorate of Health initiated a revision of coding practices in all regional 
health trusts in Norway. The directorate was concerned about the risk of coding 
practices being influenced by economic considerations, and consequently that some 
coding practices might not comply with the regulations. The directorate’s report claimed 
that «…the Directorate of Health has heard repeated allegations that health personnel 
are being pressured to code «economically favourably» even though this violates 
medically correct coding» (Health Directorate report 2011, p. 1). Prior to this initiative, 
several reports from a variety of investigators had concluded that there was still a 
significant amount of faulty coding, that the health enterprises’ steering and control of 
coding was insufficient, that there was a systematic lack of coherence between patients’ 
records and coding practices – and consequently that there was a likelihood or 
significant risk that medical, economic and performance information was of poor 
quality. The final report, co-published by the directorate and the four regional health 
trusts, ambiguously concluded that although the general risk of economically motivated 
deliberate coding fraud was low, the internal steering and control introduced to ensure 
correct coding practices was, by and large, insufficient. 
An interesting aspect of this case is that the information gathering was a joint effort 
between several central agencies and entities within the system, and that the actor under 
scrutiny in practice was the system as such. Moreover, the central idea seems to have 
been oriented towards improving a system more or less perceived as faulty – indicating 
that blame was not to be placed on single actors. Rather, the aim was to check the entire 
system for malfunctions and to suggest improvements. 
The national revision of coding practices can, however, be seen as the culmination of 
an extended process involving a series of different constellations of actors and forums. 
The background to the national revision is both individual cases of malpractice and a 
series of reports from different scrutiny bodies, including reports from SINTEF (an 
independent contract research organization), the Auditor General, and the Directorate 
of Health. This complex picture illustrates how a certain problem can be translated into 
a national context, and how fairly narrow and technical coding practices can become 
broad political issues. In the national revision of coding practices, the approach basically 
focused on systemic shortcomings rather than on single cases of code cheating. The 
perception was that coding malpractice was widespread: The Auditor General in 2009 
concluded that there had been little improvement in coding practices between 2003 and 
2008 (Dokument 3:2 (2009-2010)), which confirmed the conclusion reached by several 
commentators that the regulation of coding was insufficient. A report made by SINTEF 
in 2005 suggested that one main problem was that the coding poorly reflected what 
patient records documented, which in turn had consequences for the activity-based 
funding system. A general argument in this report is that when the coherence between 
patient records, codes and financing is poor, the desired effects of the financial system 
are reduced (incentives do not work as suggested), political decisions about hospital 
economics are based on false premises, and hospital service production statistics are 
compromised (Jørgenvåg and Hope 2005). In such situations, there seems to be more 
leeway for strategic malpractice.  
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The national revision of coding practices must be understood in connection with 
these previous reports and audits. The suggestion of measures based on the 2010/2011 
revision indirectly builds on findings from earlier processes of accountability, in effect 
creating a complex combination of accountability relations. The Auditor General serves 
an administrative as well as a political accountability function, reporting to parliament – 
which in turn holds government accountable through parliamentary mechanisms but 
also aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative apparatus. 
The research reports by SINTEF illustrate how external horizontal relationships to the 
hospital system’s extended environment are also possible accountability relationships, 
whereas the directorate’s reports have a more administrative orientation based on 
administrative-professional governance. Moreover, the coordinated effort of the 
directorate and the regional health trusts shows how concern about coding practices has 
become an overarching theme in their work.  
Whereas the early reports that formed the background to the national revision were 
characterized by more singular and classic accountability mechanisms, the national 
revision shows how accounts can provide input for policy proposals. The final revision 
report suggests a series of measures to resolve the coding problem, from stricter 
institutional arrangements and more precise guidelines to education and training 
measures for healthcare professionals, which could also be interpreted as sanctions: In a 
system where a problem has been uncovered, sanctions can just as easily be a 
reconfiguration of policy measures as punishment. In this sense, the debate phase more 
or less extends into the policymaking process. 
Discussion: Exploiting blind spots, challenging 
trust, complex accountability 
All six cases display how the link between hospital expenditure and performance turned 
out to be open to manipulation: The introduction of the DRG and ABF systems is not 
risk free, and certain loopholes or undesirable leeway is created by the introduction of 
the system. In terms of accountability, the individual cases we have investigated show 
that actors are in fact being held accountable for technical practices that cut across the 
intended effects of the overall system. The two general cases also reflect this. Whereas 
coding practices are assessed thoroughly, the idea of activity-based financial schemes, as 
such, is not. In terms of accountability then, the substance is not the performance 
management system, but the practices allowed by the system. 
In terms of corruption, most of the cases investigated here revealed that so called 
«legal corruption» most commonly entails actors acting to unduly influence the rules of 
the game for their own organization’s benefit, thus undermining norms of impartiality. 
The principles of universalism and impartiality in the implementation of activity-based 
financing and the DRG system have thus been undermined. There is also illegal 
behavior, however. Most cases involve seeking organizational gain; there are fewer 
examples of individual gain.  
In terms of accountability, it seems a range of different forums typically marks the 
information phase. The media frequently act initially as forums, whereas more formal 
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processes of information gathering are more dependent on the issue concerned. In 
some cases, where either administrative law or – more seriously – patients are at stake, 
the police become involved. Differing combinations of internal and external accounts 
are demanded, whether from specific managers, boards at different levels, audit 
agencies, or politicians. Generally there is interplay between the different types of 
accountability. In some cases, social accountability initiated by the media activated an 
administrative accountability relationship. Legal and political accountability processes 
can be observed. In other cases, semi-independent external administrative bodies 
initiated administrative accountability processes that later activated social or political 
accountability. There is a dynamic between internal processes within the hospital system 
and external, open public processes. Moreover, an interesting dynamic between 
individual scandals and the general assessments of the overall system seems to indicate 
that sustained attention to this type of problem is not enough to prevent it from 
occurring.  
The discussion phase varies from open public debate in the media on the one hand, 
to closed and internal behavior justification and questions being posed between 
managers and professionals at different levels on the other. One obvious problem in the 
DRG system is information asymmetries, which are highly prevalent and make it 
difficult for the principals to monitor and control actors’ activity and behavior. This 
asymmetry of information gives rise to several unintended consequences.  
The last phase in which judgment is passed and consequences may be faced also 
varies from general policy adjustments to public condemnation of actors’ behavior and 
the imposition of individual or organizational sanctions on actors. The sanctions are in 
some cases formal and legal, involving individuals being sacked and hospitals being 
fined, but in other cases more informal public shaming. 
Under NPM, politicians are supposed to assume a strategic role, formulating general 
goals and assessing results without being involved in single cases and day-to-day 
business and implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Public officials, on the other 
hand, are supposed to operate as managers in agencies at arm’s length from politicians 
and to be held accountable through incentives and performance systems. Our study 
reveals that both politicians and public officials find it difficult to practice these roles. 
Politicians tend to become involved in the details of implementation and in single cases. 
Public officials tend to lose a sense of a unified public service, and increasing the 
distance between them and the political executive tends to reduce responsiveness and 
accountability (Lægreid, forthcoming). The ambiguity of accountability becomes 
especially clear when things go wrong (Gregory 1998). 
Table 1 reveals «the problem of many eyes». Although new interpretations of 
accountability have proliferated with the new performance management schemes, older 
interpretations have not disappeared. Ministerial accountability remains a highly 
pervasive medium of accountability, but there is a complex mixture of political, 
administrative, legal, professional and social accountability informed by the specific 
context in which cases develop.  
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Table 1: Accountability relations by case and by type of forum and who is accountable 
  Accountability to whom? Who is accountable? 
  Political  Legal  Administrative  Professional  Social  
 
Case 1: 
Coding 
scandal 2003 
MinisterSt
ortingAudi
tor 
General 
 Regional board 
and local board 
 Media Director of regional enterprise 
Manager of local enterprise, 
Hospital manager 
Executive board of regional health 
enterprise 
Hierarchical, individual and collective 
Case 2: 
Patient record 
cheating 2010  
 Police Board of Health 
Supervision, 
local board, and 
regional board 
 Media Managers at local enterprise 
Executive board of local enterprise 
Hierarchical, individual and collective 
Case 3: Code 
cheating 
2011a 
  Advisory 
committee, 
regional board, 
and local board 
Peers (in 
debating 
phase) 
 Hospital manager 
Individual 
Case 4: Code 
cheating 
2011b 
 Police Regional board Whistle 
blowing 
Media Not decided yet, probably the 
hospital collective or /and individual 
Case 5: 
Performance 
audit 2002 
Storting, 
Minister 
 Auditor General   Organizational, 
collective 
Case 6: 
National 
revision 
2010/2011 
  Auditor General 
Directorate, 
regional boards 
and local boards  
Researchers 
(SINTEF), 
peers 
 Organizational, collective 
 
The cases illustrate how the introduction of activity based financing and the use of the 
DRG system has contributed to making accountability a more ambiguous and complex 
issue. Different and partly contradicting accountability relationships co-exist, producing 
accountability dilemmas and tensions for public officials. Administrative reforms seem 
to highlight the various dimensions of accountability, the complex context of public 
accountability, and multiple overlapping accountability relationships (Romzek 2000, 
Behn 2001). Introducing performance-management schemes, such as the ABF/DRG 
system, does not reduce complexity or ambiguity, but rather accentuate the inherent 
tensions between trust- and distrust-based arrangements.  
Most of the premises that guide administrative behavior seldom reach the attention 
of political executives and citizens, however. This means that we have to go beyond the 
hierarchical principal-agent approach to accountability and allow more dynamic multi-
dimensional and hybrid accountability relationships. There is a need for a more open 
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dialogue between doctors, hospitals, managers, political executives, parliament and the 
general public. The accountability problem cannot be reduced to a kind of technical 
pathology, but has to be seen in the wider context of political legitimacy.  
We have also revealed there is a ‘problem of many hands’ (Thompson 1980) 
regarding accountability relations in the hospital sector. Who the accountable actor is, 
varies from case to case. In some cases the organization as a whole is held accountable, 
in other cases individual managers or officials are called to account. We also see a 
tendency for officials at the lower levels of organizations to be held accountable rather 
than executive directors of health enterprises and political leaders. Interestingly, senior 
and middle managers as well as executive boards are both actors and forums in a 
hierarchical chain of accountability. In contrast to the individual scandals the overall 
assessments by the Auditor General and the Directorate of Health tend to come to 
ambiguous conclusions regarding which actor should be held to account, more 
commonly addressing collective accountability for the system in general. Taken together 
these cases paint a varied picture of accountability as a multi-dimensional concept 
regarding who is accountable to whom. Horizontal, informal and voluntary 
accountability relations, illustrated by the role of the mass media, supplement 
hierarchical and formal principal-agent accountability. The puzzle is that in spite of a 
multi-dimensional accountability regime and an active enforcement of different 
accountability relations, the problem does not seem to disappear.  
This study indicates, firstly, that the expectations of increased efficiency without 
negative side-effects are hard to fulfill. Our analysis of the DRG system and activity-
based funding suggests that increased output measurement in the public sector is likely 
to involve dysfunctions. The problems of goal displacement and inappropriate reward 
systems are well known, and in spite of the novel intentions of performance 
management, there are unintended consequences (van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Our 
analysis shows examples of several such features, including negative collective effects 
from focusing on «local rationality» in cheating on the system, or seeking certain 
valuable patient groups, resulting in goal displacement and distorting priorities among 
patient groups. Such flaws might be connected to «perverse learning»: Once 
organizations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured, 
they can use that information to manipulate their assessments, as with «false» coding of 
different diseases (Meyer and Gupta 1994). This represents a shift in focus concerning 
accountability, from a broadly defined public interest to a more narrowly defined set of 
personal or organizational interests. 
Hood and Beven (2006) have identified three kinds of health care managers: Firstly, 
there are the «honest triers», who share regulators’ objectives, do their best to meet the 
standards set, and do not «game» when they fail. These are typical representatives of 
trust-based systems. Secondly, there are «reactive gamers», who also share the objectives 
of the regulators, but try to game the system when they fail. This can be done by 
creative interpretation of coding rules, but also by data falsification in order to turn 
failures or bad performance into successes on paper. Thirdly, there are «rational 
maniacs», who pursue goals consistently, at times illegally, often running counter to the 
intentions of the health care system, and who game the system in order to cover their 
tracks.  
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The individual coding cases might be seen as a case of «reactive gamers», although 
the illegal coding practices also suggest the existence of ««rational maniacs» 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006). This may indicate that combining professional 
autonomy and discretionary reward systems is troublesome when professionally 
appropriate behavior, based on informal norms and cultural traditions, is replaced by 
self-interested rational strategies that are blind to context. Adding to this, there is the 
potentially problematic role of managers in such systems. They might not necessarily 
confine themselves to complying passively with externally formulated rules, but can be 
more proactive in using various managerial tactics to develop and exploit organizational 
performance-management systems in biased ways (DiMaggio 1988, Oliver 1991, Modell 
2004). Such risk-taking behavior will potentially undermine trust in the system (see 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001).  
Regarding the two models of management, the high trust institutional model and the 
low trust instrumental model, our findings are more in line with hybrids of the two 
rather than either/or practices (see also Pollitt 2006). The accountability relations that 
are activated are both what was expected from the instrumental model (political and 
administrative accountability) and from the institutional model (social and professional 
accountability). On the one hand, the low-trust instrumental model of discipline and 
control does not seem to be fully applied. The DRG arrangements work within a wider 
framework of understandings and norms. There are examples of disciplining agencies 
that have failed to follow the rules, but also of discussions and negotiations between 
bodies at different levels of how to solve the problems of mismanagement and gaming. 
The actions taken seem to be both adjustments of rules and procedures and punishment 
of individuals and organizations. On the other hand, the institutional trust-based model 
was not fully applied either. Different actors had a large amount of autonomy and 
flexibility in practicing the system, but this discretion was not informed by a common 
understanding based on mutual trust relations. Rather, local cultures developed that 
were at odds with the general public values behind the established system.  
Thus, the two models seem to supplement each other rather than being alternative or 
competing models of understanding how the DRG activity-based funding system in the 
hospital sector works in practice. The opportunities created by reforming the structural 
and functional arrangements through performance management schemes seem to 
challenge trust relations and create room for both the «reactive gamer» and the «rational 
maniac»: Once measures have been developed to evaluate compliance or performance, 
they invite manipulation. Any system of accounts is a road map to cheating on them, to 
cite March (1981). 
Instead of describing and explaining the practice of the ABF/DRG system using one 
dominant logic, we advocate drawing a more complex picture of how the system works. 
In practice we are now confronted with a mixed system, in which the traditional 
cooperative and trust-based policy style is combined with new performance-
management techniques. The DRG-based financial performance system shows the 
potential dysfunctions of such a system: Negative side effects that the political-
administrative leadership tries to modify or stop, but which are difficult to get rid of. 
Serving both the «quasi-market» and the public seems to be a delicate endeavor. Both 
the creation of the health enterprise system and the introduction of activity-based 
GAMING THE SYSTEM AND ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS NOTAT  9  -  2012  
 27 
financing were matters of reform—i.e. new measures combined with existing normative 
and structural features (Byrkjeflot and Neby 2008) in which complexity became a more 
dominant feature than the elegance suggested in company-like structures and activity-
based financing. 
It is difficult to mend a system by just changing the incentives. We face what are 
labeled second-order collective action problems (Ostrøm 1998, Rothstein 2005): 
Hospital physicians may well understand that they would gain from eradicating 
corruption-like behavior, but because they cannot trust most other physicians to do the 
same, they have no reason to refrain from mismanagement. The only way to avoid this 
would be to establish institutions that would enable them to trust other physicians to 
change their practice as well (Rothstein 2011). Thus, mutual expectations and behavior 
based on reciprocity are important. What is important for practice is what one actor 
believes about the strategy of another. This might end as a ‘social trap’, to use 
Rothstein’s term. The physicians in a group who have lost trust in each another cannot 
easily produce the level of trust that is needed to enhance collaboration to establish a 
common set of institutions, even if they all know they would benefit (Rothstein 2005, 
2011). This could arguably be why it seems so difficult to change the ill practices of the 
activity-based system simply by changing the incentives and making the DRG system 
more sophisticated. Corrupt hospital doctors and managers may realize that they would 
all gain by ending corrupt behavior, but it becomes pointless for individual actors to 
stop the corruption if they cannot trust that most other actors would do the same.  
Our empirical cases demonstrate how difficult it is to design an incentive system 
based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates. In public 
bureaucracy, the cost of using incentives is likely to be high and concentrating on 
incentives can crowd out trust and the very qualities in a relationship that makes the 
reform measure work (Miller 1992, Miller and Whitford 2002). The challenge is to 
inspire cooperation and to bypass the short-term interests of employees and managers. 
Conclusion  
The activity based financing/DRG cases suggest it is necessary to separate formal 
arrangements from practice. There are two main views on how to handle the problems 
of the DRG system. The first regards this as an implementation problem, attributable to 
lack of knowledge and experience, and it is argued that it can be solved through more 
education, training, control and a more sophisticated system. The second viewpoint sees 
creative coding as a logical consequence of the system itself. According to this 
viewpoint, the problem is more fundamental and is an inherent feature of the system 
associated with the underlying policy theory. Thus, greater technical sophistication 
might not be enough to reduce dysfunction. Neither does a more sophisticated 
accountability regime. If outcome and output are difficult to observe, which is often the 
case when classifying illnesses, treatment and surgery, then efforts to introduce more 
sophisticated and more precise methods of measuring output will probably be of little 
help. The quest for greater specificity in output and performance measurement might be 
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self-defeating if critical differences between tasks are not taken into account (Lonti and 
Gregory 2004). 
Such reform measures with their strong emphasis on efficiency might undermine 
traditional public service values of trust, fairness, predictability, equity, and due process 
(Hood 1991). Generally, the DRG/ABF system assumes the culture of public service 
honesty as a given, but at the same time it builds on assumptions of distrust and self-
interest. This may undermine the common culture and identity, and create a shift 
towards a more individualist culture. It is an open question whether there will be an 
erosion of the traditional values of impartiality and honesty (Hood 1991), but the 
loopholes and possibilities created by these systems may well indicate an inherent or 
latent corruption problem.  
We have revealed a multiple accountability regime in which the different 
accountability mechanisms complement each other. Accountability has not decreased, 
but rather multiplied (Klenk and Pieper 2012). A key challenge is how to handle such 
hybrid accountability relations as they are embedded in partly competing institutional 
logics. Multiple accountabilities may be appropriate solutions for an increasingly 
pluralistic governance system, as accountability is about managing diverse and partly 
conflicting expectations (Romzek and Dubnick 1987). Calling officials to account means 
inviting them to explain and justify their actions within a context of shared beliefs and 
values (March and Olsen 1995, Dubnick and Fredericksson 2011), which implies a 
dialogue between officials and those to whom they are accountable. It seems that for 
performance management systems such as DRG/ABF to work, we must go beyond the 
instrumental flavor of accountability and the focus on principal-agent relations to 
include both a logic of appropriateness and accountability mechanisms that espouse 
intrinsic values such as integrity, democratic legitimacy, justice, fairness and public 
mission. 
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